The prevailing wisdom is that state exemption laws and garnishment laws have little impact on the average household. But, examining their impact on the average household paints an incomplete picture-to truly understand the relationship between state laws and bankruptcy we must examine the heterogeneous impact these laws have across households. Indeed, in focusing on the average impact, prior works largely ignored the differences state exemption and garnishment laws generate in the characteristics of filers across states. For example, in 2013, the average bankrupt *
). This paper shows that state exemption laws and garnishment laws do matter when it comes to bankruptcy-they play a significant role in determining which households will file for bankruptcy. The public policy implications are significant. These findings suggest that a household with a given set of financial characteristics will seek bankruptcy relief if it resides in one state but will have to use alternative consumption smoothing measures if it lives in a different state. To be sure, it is not clear whether bankruptcy is the most desirable form of consumption insurance-although it is costly, it provides households with a fresh start and encourages participation in the work force. And while determining the optimal exemption and garnishment laws is left for future research, for the first time, this paper shows that by changing its garnishment or exemption laws, states significantly impact which households file for bankruptcy.
In order to explore the heterogeneous impact of state laws across households, I
develop a new theoretical model of bankruptcy. In this model, households choose between three options: repayment, bankruptcy, and informal bankruptcy (non-repayment without the benefit of the formal bankruptcy process). While it is an important form of consumption insurance for many households, only a handful of theoretical models anticipate the potential for informal bankruptcy. The addition of this third option is particularly important here, because-like the bankruptcy option-the costs and benefits of informal bankruptcy depend on state exemption laws and garnishment laws. With these three options, my model predicts that (1) high asset households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high exemption levels, and (2) low income households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high garnishment rates. I test the model's predictions with a new household level dataset. I find that while exemption laws have a minimal impact on the average household's decision to file for bankruptcy, they significantly impact wealthy households.
The intuition is straightforward. The average household only has $15,000 in home equity. The difference between an exemption of $20,000, $100,000, or even an unlimited amount is meaningless for this household, such that the household will not even consider exemption levels when making the decision to file for bankruptcy. But for households with higher assets, these differences are important. For example, households with $225,000 in home equity are 1.7 times more likely to file for bankruptcy in a state with a high exemption level than in states with a low exemption level. I also find that while garnishment rates have a minimal impact on the average household's decision to file for bankruptcy, low income households are greatly impacted by such laws. For example, whereas the average household (which earns $35,000 per year) does not show any significant response to differences in garnishment rates, households earning less than $10,000 per year are 1.6 times more likely to file for bankruptcy in a state with a high garnishment rate than a state with a low garnishment rate.
I. Institutional Background
The United States has two primary procedures for personal bankruptcy---Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, households liquidate (some of) their property. The amount of property that a household must liquidate depends on state law; each state has its own exemption laws which protect an individual's unsecured assets both inside and outside of bankruptcy.
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There are two types of exemption laws:
homestead exemption laws and personal exemption laws. Homestead exemption laws protect a household's residence (or more specifically, their home equity) while personal exemptions protect personal property such as jewelry and appliances. Like most empirical works, this paper concentrates on homestead exemption laws, as they are substantially larger and more readily quantified. 2 As seen in Table 1 , these homestead exemption levels vary significantly across states. Six states (Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas) have "unlimited" homestead exemptions meaning that (literally) an unlimited amount of home equity is protected from seizure by creditors.
In these states, debtors will not be forced to sell their house to pay off their creditors. On the other hand, three states (Arkansas, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) protect less than $1,000 in home equity. If a homeowner in one of these states files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and has more than $1,000 in home equity, then he must surrender his home. The home is then sold, and the homeowner receives less than $1,000 (specifically, $800 if living in Arkansas, $0 if living in New Jersey, and $300 if living in Pennsylvania). The remaining proceeds are then distributed amongst the household's 1 Exemption laws protect households against involuntary liens or unsecured debts. However, they do not protect households against voluntary liens or consensual secured debts. Thus, exemption laws do not protect households against foreclosure.
2 Personal property exemptions list the type of personal property an individual can protect in bankruptcy. Typically, they refer to categories of basic necessities, like food, clothes, furnishings or tools of trade, but sometimes they refer to specific items, like herds of sheep or military uniforms. However, unlike homestead exemption laws, most personal exemption laws do not place a dollar value on protected assets; as a result, they are difficult to quantify. In Delaware for example, a household's clothing, jewelry, books, family portraits, piano, leased organs, sewing machines, burial plot, and church pew are all protected by personal exemption laws. Similarly, in Texas, personal exemption laws protect the family Bible, household pets, two horses with saddle, blanket and bridle for each, twelve head of cattle, 120 fowl, and any food on hand for these animals. Using several different calculation techniques, Hynes, Malani and Posner (2003) determined that the average personal exemption law protects approximately $6,000 of assets. By comparison, the average homestead exemption law protects approximately $50,000 of assets. Given their size, I am generally not concerned about omitted variable bias.
creditors and the household's remaining debts are discharged (forgiven). Most unsecured debts, including credit card debts, installment loans, medical debts, unpaid rent and utility bills, tort judgments, and business debts, can be discharged under Chapter 7. Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may keep all of his future earnings.
Alternatively, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, households retain all of their assets and instead agree to repay some of their debts from future earnings.
3 Debtors pay their projected monthly disposable income (the difference between their monthly income and monthly budgeted living expenses) into the Chapter 13 repayment plan. After making payments for three to five years, the case is closed, and any remaining debts are discharged. 4 It is important to note that the repayment plan must compensate creditors at least as much as they would receive under Chapter 7.
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For households facing serious debt, there are many advantages to filing for bankruptcy. First, as mentioned above, through the bankruptcy process households are able to discharge much of their unsecured debt-it is estimated that the average household discharges approximately $36,000 of debt upon filing for bankruptcy (Culhane and White 1999) . Second, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "automatic stay" that immediately pauses all collection efforts including foreclosure proceedings and wage 3 In 2007, less than 40 percent of cases were filed under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. As mentioned in the text, the major benefit of filing a Chapter 13 is asset retention. But, compared to Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is an extensive and lengthy process---under Chapter 13, households must make monthly payments for three to five years. In contrast, Chapter 7 cases typically last less than six months. As shown in Lefgren, McIntyre and Miller (2010) , the best observable predictor of chapter choice is the consumer's attorney; households are likely to file under Chapter 13 if they consult a bankruptcy lawyer who specializes in Chapter 13 cases. 4 A household with income below the state's median income level must make payments within a three-year period (unless ordered otherwise by the Court), while a household with income above the state's median income level must make payments within a five year period.
5 Under the so-called "best interests of creditors test," a court may not confirm a chapter 13 plan unless it finds that the plan will provide unsecured creditors with at least as much as they would receive if the debtor were "liquidated under chapter 7." See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
garnishments. 6 The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) states that 75 percent of wages or 30 times the federal minimum wage per week (whichever is higher)
is protected from garnishment. 7 However, the CCPA allows states to enact their own garnishment laws, provided that these laws protect a greater portion of borrowers' wages than the federal share. As seen in Table 1 , five states---North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas---currently prohibit wage garnishment except for debts related to taxes, child support, federally guaranteed student loans, court-ordered fines or restitution for a crime the debtor committed. An additional 18 states have thresholds that are higher than the federal law. 8 However, again, once a household files for bankruptcy, wage garnishment must stop.
Regardless of the financial benefits, bankruptcy is a costly endeavor. In addition to the nearly $300 filing fee, households must pay attorney fees, which average $1,830 (Palank 2008) . Moreover, there are non-pecuniary costs to bankruptcy, including the stigma of bankruptcy and future restrictions from the credit market. And finally, households must either forfeit a portion of their assets (as they do in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy) or a portion of their future income (as they do in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
6 Garnishment can be taken for any type of debt---common examples include defaulted child support, taxes, court fines, and student loans. Wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, and income from retirement programs can all be garnished if a household fails to repay its debts. 7 On February 1, 2007, the federal minimum wage was $5.15. Thus, at the time my sample was collected, at least $154.50 (30 x $5.15) of weekly wages was exempt from garnishment. When an employee's weekly wages exceeded $154.50 but were less than $206.00, only the amount over $154.50 could be garnished. For example, if an employee earned $165 in a particular week, only $5.50 could be garnished. When an employee's earnings were $206.00 or more in a given week, up to 25 percent of those earnings could be garnished. For an employee earning $250.00 a week, 25 percent of his earnings (or $62.50) could be garnished while $187.50 had to be paid to the employee. 8 As shown in Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) state garnishment and exemption laws are not correlated. It is not the case that a state protects households from their creditors by passing both high homestead exemption laws and low garnishment rates. Indeed the correlation between these two laws is 0.00.
II. Literature Review
To be sure, numerous papers have explored the impact of state laws on bankruptcy. However, most have focused on the impact these laws have on the average household; none have studied their heterogeneous impact.
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For example, using aggregate data, many papers regressed state (Apilado, Dauten and Smith 1978; Shiers and Williamson 1987; Weiss, Bhandari and Robins 2001; Fisher 2001) , district (Buckley and Brinig 1998) , county (White 1987) , or zip code (Lefgren and McIntyre 2009) It should be noted that Fay, Hurst and White (2002) found that the "financial benefit" of bankruptcy has a positive and significant impact on the probability of bankruptcy. Financial benefit is defined as the debt that can be discharged less nonexempt assets a debtor loses by filing. Unfortunately, with this definition, the heterogeneous impact of exemption levels cannot be disentangled from additional units of assets or debts. In other words, their results may imply that high exemption laws encourage high asset households to file for bankruptcy. However, they could also imply that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they have high levels of debt.
10 One notable exception is White (1987) which found that high exemption levels were correlated with high bankruptcy rates. However, because the analysis is performed at the county level, and the author did not correct the standard errors for clustering within states, Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) note that it is likely that the precision of the estimates is overstated. This paper also builds on the theoretical literature on personal bankruptcy.
Whereas prior papers provide empirical evidence that households choose between repayment, bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy (for example : Agarwal, Liu, and Mielnicki 2003; Dawsey and Ausubel 2004; Hynes 2008; Dawsey, Hynes and Ausubel 2013) , existing theoretical models (Gropp, Scholz and White 1997; Nelson 1999 White 1998). Given the growing number of consumers who choose informal bankruptcy (Dawsey, Hynes, and Ausubel 2013) , it is an important component to my theoretical model. Indeed, in 2007, when this data for this paper was collected, 7.1 percent of U.S. families reported to be at least 60 days behind on one of their loans (Bucks et al. 2009 ).
III. Model
The theoretical model presented in this section highlights the heterogeneous impact of state exemption and garnishment laws on a household's bankruptcy decision.
Like Chatterjee and Gordon (2012) , Chatterjee (2010) , Han and Li (2007) , and White (1998) , in this model households choose between three options---repayment, bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy. In informal bankruptcy, households do not repay their loans yet they do not seek formal bankruptcy protection. These households are subject to both wage garnishment and seizure of their nonexempt assets. This model expands these prior works by developing a two-period model of bankruptcy.
11 Expanding the traditional one-period model of bankruptcy to a two-period model is important as it allows a 11 Repetto (1998) and Pavan (2008) also expanded the one-period model of bankruptcy into a two-period model of bankruptcy. However, neither paper considered the impact of garnishment rates. Furthermore, neither paper included informal bankruptcy in their theoretical model. household's assets, debts, and the interest rate to depend on the state's exemption and garnishment laws.
A. The Household's Problem
In this model, risk averse households live for two periods and maximize their expected lifetime utility. In the first period, households receive income Y 1 . However, second period income (Y 2 ) is uncertain; Y 2 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In the first period, households choose their first period consumption (C 1 ), assets (A) which can be used for future consumption, and debt (D).
12 Lenders charge interest rate r on a loan, which as discussed below, depends on the household's assets and debts as well as the state exemption level and garnishment rate. 13 The household's first period budget constraint is given by
In the second period, the household learns its income, and given its assets A and debts D(1+r), decides whether to file for bankruptcy. If it files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the household must surrender nonexempt assets and pay a filling fee. All remaining debts are then discharged. Thus, the households consumption is given by C 2 ≤ Y 2 + min(A,E) -F where E represents the state exemption level and F denotes the filing 12 Without bankruptcy, a consumer will either borrow or save; he will not do both. However, when bankruptcy is available, households may borrow and save simultaneously. Although debt requires paying an interest rate premium, the prospect of not having to repay the debt in full lowers this premium.
As will be discussed below, in order to be consistent with bankruptcy law, assets represent home equity while debt represents unsecured loans such as credit card debts.
This model does not distinguishing between the value of the home and the amount of the mortgage; in order to make this distinction, the model would need to include an additional choice variable. Again, the purpose of this model is to show how state exemption levels impact a household's bankruptcy decision. As exemption levels only apply to non-consensual secured debts, this simplification should not be worrisome.
Additionally, this model does not address consensual secured loans. Again, the purpose of this model is to show how state exemption levels impact a household's bankruptcy decision. Fundamentally, homestead exemptions do not protect a homeowner against foreclosure by a mortgagee. Homestead exemptions apply only against involuntary liens or unsecured debts. Because exemptions are not relevant to consensual secured debt, mortgages are not modeled here.
13 This set-up assumes that assets pay an interest return normalized to unity while debts carry a gross interest rate of r. This simplification does not alter my model 's predictions. fee.
14 If the household files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, it must surrender its income and pay a filing fee. However, the consumer may keep all its assets. Again, all remaining debts are then discharged. Thus, the household's consumption is given by
. 15 Because households must repay creditors at least as much in a Chapter 13 repayment plan as in a Chapter 7 and because creditors can petition to convert a Chapter 7 into a Chapter 13 if it is in their best interest, if a household files for bankruptcy, its consumption is given by
If the household does not file for bankruptcy, its second period consumption is given by
When the household repays its debt in full Q(Y 2 ,A,D,r) = D(1+r).
When the household chooses informal bankruptcy,
Q(Y 2 ,A,D,r)=gY 2 +max(A-E,0)
, where g denotes the state's garnishment rate. Recall that when a consumer fails to repay his debts, he is subject to wage garnishment (at rate g) and creditors may sue the household for his non-exempt assets, max(A-E,0). Thus,
Q(Y 2 ,A,D,r)=min[gY 2 + max(A-E,0), D(1+r)]. 16
Therefore in the second period, households file for bankruptcy when
In addition to the filing fee, F incorporates attorney fees, the stigma of bankruptcy, and the cost of future credit market exclusion.
15 More realistically, when filing under Chapter 13, a household only surrenders a portion of its income. As detailed above, households pay their projected monthly disposable income into the Chapter 13 repayment plan. This is calculated by taking their projected monthly income and subtracting both actual expenses (including spending on taxes, payroll deductions, term life insurance, court-ordered payments, and utilities) as well as standardized expenses (including healthcare, housing, utilities, vehicle expenses, and public transportation expenses). Therefore, it may be more realistic to state that when filing under Chapter 13, a household's consumption is given by C2≤ βY + A -F. However, the simplification does not alter my model 's predictions. 16 Households who choose informal bankruptcy may also suffer from non-pecuniary repercussions such as stigma or future exclusion from the credit market. 
I assume that the household's utility is only defined over their consumption. For an alternative model see Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) .
18 It is important to note that households do not choose their exemption level E. According to Section 548(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, debtors cannot manipulate homestead exemptions by moving to another state. This section states that if a debtor moved within the past 730 days, he is bound by the exemption level of the state in which he previously resided.
From this maximization problem, it is clear that an additional unit of debt increases first period utility and only decreases second period utility of the household chooses repayment. Therefore, the household's first order condition with respect to debt is as follows:
Similarly, while an additional asset decreases first period utility, it increases second period utility if the household chooses informal bankruptcy with assets below the exemption level, files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 with assets below the exemption level, files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, or repays its debts in full. Thus, the first order condition with respect to assets is:
B. The Lender's Problem
Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral. Their zero profit condition is given by:
where the first three terms represent partial repayment from informal bankruptcy, Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Chapter 13 respectively. The fourth term represents full repayment and 19 Leibnitz rule
is used to find the first order conditions. r f is the risk free rate of return. If no interest rate satisfies this equation, lenders will not lend. I assume that lending is limited by D(1+r) < 1.
The lender's first order condition with respect to the interest rate is:
The first term represents the lender's gain if the household files under Chapter 7 and has non-exempt assets. If a lender increases the interest rate, the household will increase its assets. Thus, if the household has nonexempt assets and files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the lender will receive a higher payment. The second term represents the lender's gain if the household repays its debts in full. This term represents two conflicting forces. If a lender increases the interest rate, the household will decrease their debts but the household is less likely to repay in full.
C. Predictions about Assets, Debts and the Interest Rate
The first order conditions are totally differentiated and Cramer's rule is used to solve for dr/dE ≥ 0.
20 Because high exemption levels protect assets if the household chooses informal or formal bankruptcy, lenders realize lower profits. As a result, lenders will charge a higher interest rate in states with high exemption levels.
Similarly, the model predicts that dA/dE ≥ 0 and dD/dE ≥ 0. These derivatives indicate that in high exemption states, households will simultaneously accumulate assets and debts; Lehnert and Maki (2002) On the other hand, more households will file for bankruptcy (instead of choosing informal bankruptcy); these households will repay less debt. This creates an incentive for lenders to increase interest rates. Because this later effect is larger, the interest rate is higher in states with high garnishment rates.
D. Predictions About Bankruptcy
Again, households file for bankruptcy when
. From this condition, the model makes several predictions about the likelihood of bankruptcy:
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• High asset households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high exemption levels. 21 For more details on these calculations, see the Mathematical Appendix.
• Low income households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high garnishment rates.
• The likelihood of bankruptcy is decreasing in A.
• The likelihood of bankruptcy is increasing in D.
IV. Data Description
To test these predictions, I use data from two sources. Data on bankrupt households was hand-collected from bankruptcy petitions while data on control households came from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
A. Bankruptcy Sample
When Furthermore, data from bankruptcy filings yield more reliable results than survey data 22 There are several advantages to collecting data from February 1, 2007. Because I collected data from 2007, I was able to collect a nationally representative dataset---prior to 2007 many bankruptcy courts did not use PACER's Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system. Therefore, it would not have been possible to collect a nationally representative sample of cases electronically. February 1st was selected as a random date at the beginning of the year; the bankruptcy petitions collect information on the household's income from the previous two calendar years. Thus, for petitions filed on this date, I likely have accurate income information.
Because my data was collected in 2007, my sample consists of data from cases filed after the BAPCPA---this paper is one of the first to examine bankrupt households since the Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005. White and Zhu (2010) Prior research suggests that missing demographic data should not be a concern. In fact, earlier works argue that once financial characteristics are controlled for, demographic characteristics are irrelevant. In interviewing 400 households, Stanley and Girth (1971) found that demographic considerations did not influence the bankruptcy decision. Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) confirmed this result; they found that race was statistically insignificant in explaining aggregate filing rates. As shown in the sixth column of Table 3 , my results do not change when I exclude the imputed demographic variables.
28 Bankruptcy petitions contain a wealth of other information as well. For example, in addition to the variables mentioned above, Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, McMenamin and Skiba (2010) mention that bankruptcy petitions include information on monthly expenditures, number of creditors, and previous bankruptcy filings. However, as my control sample does not contain these covariates, they are not included in my regressions.
29 Because bankrupt households are not identified in this study, I assume that none of the households in the PSID filed for bankruptcy. However, because 1.2 percent of all households in the United States filed for bankruptcy in 2007, some households in my control group may have filed for bankruptcy. Cosslett (1981) and Lancaster and Imbens (1996) develop an estimation procedure to annual measures of family income, the PSID provides a detailed inventory of the family's home equity and unsecured debts. Demographic information is also provided.
C. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics, comparing bankrupt and non-bankrupt households, can be found in Table 2 Finally, Region is a vector of regional dummy variables. Recall, the model predicts that high asset households are more likely to file for bankruptcy in states with high exemption levels ( α 1 = 0 and α 2 > 0) and that low income households are more likely to file for bankruptcy in states with high garnishment rates (α 3 > 0 and α 4 < 0). Additionally, the 31 This paper is motivated by the cross-state differences in the characteristics of bankrupt households. It does not seek to examine the cross-state differences in the characteristics of households who choose informal bankruptcy. Therefore, my regression examines the probability that a household files for bankruptcy.
V. Estimation

A. Probability of Bankruptcy
From a policy perspective, understanding the cross-state differences in the characteristics of bankrupt households is important because bankruptcy is an expensive form of consumption insurance. In addition to the filing fees and attorney fees mentioned above, bankruptcy imposes a large cost on creditors as they must write off the debt that households discharge. While informal bankruptcy can also help households smooth consumption, it arguably imposes a smaller cost on society---households do not pay legal fees or filing fees. In addition, creditors typically do not write off the debt (or at least do not write the debts off immediately). Furthermore, White (1998) argues that informal bankruptcy often leads to formal bankruptcy. For these reasons, this paper focuses on the crossstate differences in the characteristics of households who choose formal and not informal bankruptcy. 32 Exemption levels are adjusted based on the family structure. A survey of state exemption laws reveals that one third of states have exemption levels greater than the mean exemption of $40,000. Accordingly, the dummy variable High Exemption equals one if more than $40,000 of a household's home equity is protected by a homestead exemption law. However, as shown in columns III and IV, my findings are robust to alternative definitions. 33 As discussed in Section I, under federal law, creditors may garnish twenty five percent of wages. Many states, however, have placed further limits on the garnishment rate. The dummy variable High Garnishment equals one in states that use the federal garnishment limits. However, as shown in column V, my findings are robust to an alternative definition. model predicts that the probability of bankruptcy is decreasing in assets and increasing in debts (α 5 < 0 and α 6 > 0).
If the sample were random, equation (1) could be estimated using a simple linear probability regression.
34 However, the sample at hand is not random; instead it is choice-based. 35 Therefore, as detailed in Manski and Lerman (1977) equation (1) must be estimated using weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood estimation (WESMLE). By controlling for the oversampling of bankrupt households, I am able to obtain consistent estimates. Specifically, I weight each term by the inverse of the ex-ante probability that an observation is included in the sample. Let Q 1 denote the fraction of the population that is bankrupt and H 1 denote the fraction of the sample that is bankrupt.
Then each bankrupt household is weighted by Q 1 / H 1 and each non-bankrupt household is
Regression coefficients are reported in Table 3 . All errors are clustered at the state level. In column I, I estimate the probability of bankruptcy without any interaction terms. Like prior works, I find that neither state law has an impact on the average household.
In column II, I include the interaction terms suggested by my model. In line with my model's predictions, while the dummy variable High Exemption is insignificant, it is positive and statistically significant when interacted with home equity. In other words, high exemption levels have a statistically significant impact on high asset households.
Also in line with my model's predictions, I find that the dummy variable High
34
Because of the interaction terms, a linear probability model is preferable to a logit or probit model. See Ai and Norton (2003) for a discussion of interaction terms in logit and probit models.
35 Choice-based sampling arises when selection into the sample is determined by the dependent variable. Like many surveys, I have oversampled an infrequently made choice. With such a dataset, OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent (Manski and Lerman 1977) .
Garnishment has a positive impact on bankruptcy that declines with income. In other words, high garnishment rates have a statistically significant impact on low income households. Other coefficients have the expected signs. The probability of bankruptcy is decreasing in home equity, increasing in unsecured debts, and decreasing in changes in income.
In columns III-V, I show that my results are robust to alternative definitions of High Exemption and High Garnishment. In column II, I use the state's actual exemption level (a continuous variable) and its interaction with home equity. Again, the interaction term has a positive and statistically significant impact on bankruptcy. Similarly, in column IV, I include a continuous variable denoting the household's non-exempt assets (i.e. the household's assets above the exemption level). As expected, the likelihood of bankruptcy is decreasing in non-exempt assets---again, this result shows that high asset households are more likely to file for bankruptcy in states with high exemption levels. In column VI, I re-run the regression, using only known demographic variables---my results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the imputed demographic variables.
Admittedly, the reported coefficients presented in columns I-VI, could be biased by spatially correlated variables that are not observed by the econometrician. For example, households in a particular state could be influenced by the same social norms, legal culture, and preferences to repay debt---regional fixed effects may not control for these unobserved characteristics. To examine this issue, in column VII, I re-run my regression with state fixed effects. It is important to recognize that with the inclusion of state fixed effects I cannot estimate the level effect of state bankruptcy laws. However, the interaction effects between the laws and various household characteristics can still be identified. The inclusion of state fixed effects does not alter the coefficients on my interaction terms. Additionally, it is worth noting that these state fixed effects have little explanatory value---indeed their partial r-squared is only 0.007. This important robustness check should alleviate any concern that my results are driven by state-level omitted variables, or even that they are driven by variations in the cost of living across states.
B. Heterogeneous Impact Across Households
In Table 4 , to better understand the heterogeneous impact of state laws on a household's bankruptcy decision, I examine the likelihood of bankruptcy for different household groups. 36 For the average household, with approximately $15,000 in home equity, the probability of bankruptcy is nearly identical in high and low exemption states.
In either state, the average probability of filing is approximately 0.015. Understandably, the difference between a $20,000, $50,000, $100,000, or even an unlimited exemption level is meaningless for this household. This explains why most prior studies were unable to find an empirical relationship between exemption levels and bankruptcy.
However, high asset households are greatly impacted by high exemption laws. As seen in Table 4 , I find that households with approximately $225,000 in home equity are 1.7 36 All other factors are held constant at the mean of the data for the 6,984 households in the PSID. These results are based on my baseline specification, seen in the second column of Table 3. times more likely to file for bankruptcy in a state with a high exemption level than a low exemption level.
Table 4 also confirms that low income households are more likely to file in high garnishment states. In fact, households with income below $10,000 are over 1.6 times more likely to file for bankruptcy in a high garnishment state. For these households, whether they are subject to 25 percent, 10 percent, or no garnishment has a large impact on their bankruptcy decision. Notice however, that for high income households, earning approximately $110,000, the predicted probability of bankruptcy is nearly identical in high and low garnishment states. Table 5 gives predicted changes in the probability of filing for bankruptcy that result from hypothetical policy changes. Suppose first that every state enacts a high exemption level, protecting at least $40,000 of home equity. The model predicts that the average probability of bankruptcy would rise by 0.00058. 37 Since the average probability additional bankruptcy filings would occur per year. Given that the average household discharges an estimated $36,000 in unsecured debt (Culhane and White 1999) , this hypothetical policy change would lead to an additional $1.1 billion of debt being discharged each year.
C. Policy Implications
37 I calculate the change in each household's probability of filing for bankruptcy. Note that the probability of filing for bankruptcy does not change for households currently living in states with high exemption levels.
Next, suppose every state enacts a high garnishment rate, allowing garnishment at the federal limit of 25 percent. The model predicts that the average probability of bankruptcy would rise by 0.00219. 38 Since the average probability of filing in my sample 
D. Levels of Debts and Assets
The model also predicts that households "borrow to save" in states with high exemption levels and high garnishment rates. Recall that because there is a greater likelihood that households will file for bankruptcy in these states, there is a greater likelihood that a household will be able to retain its assets without having to repay its debts. This creates an incentive for households to accumulate additional assets at the cost of additional units of debts. To date, no other bankruptcy paper has addressed whether debts or assets depend on the state's exemption and garnishment laws. Most earlier works have assumed that a household's assets and debts are exogenous; three notable exemptions (Repetto 1998; Lehnert and Maki 2002; Pavan 2008 ) examined whether assets and debts to depend on exemption laws. However, as detailed in the model above, debts and assets depend on both exemption and garnishment laws.
Using data from the PSID, I examine whether assets and debts depend on state exemption and garnishment laws. Independent variables include dummy variables 38 Again, I calculate the change in each household's probability of filing for bankruptcy. Note that the probability of filing for bankruptcy does not change for households currently living in states with high garnishment rates. denoting high exemption levels and high garnishment rates, the household characteristics detailed above, and regional dummy variables. Table 6 reports regression coefficients using seemingly unrelated regression analysis (SUR).
39 Again, the errors are clustered at the state level. Consistent with the model's predictions, the coefficients on High Exemption are both positive and significant, indicating that households "borrow to save" in states with high exemption levels. However, high garnishment rates only appear to impact household's assets, not their debts.
VI. Conclusion
While state exemption laws and garnishment laws may not impact the average household, this paper shows that they have a significant impact on some households. To study the heterogeneous impact of state laws across households, this paper develops an alternative theoretical model of bankruptcy. The model predicts that high asset households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high exemption levels and low income households have a higher probability of filing for bankruptcy in states with high garnishment rates. It also predicts that households will accumulate more assets and debts in states with high exemption levels and high garnishment rates. These predictions are confirmed using a newly created householdlevel dataset and choice-based estimation techniques. The results are robust to a variety of specification checks and are unlikely driven by omitted state-level variables.
These findings have important policy implications. Because of state exemption laws and garnishment laws, a household with a given set of financial characteristics will seek bankruptcy relief if it resides in one state but will use alternative consumption 39 See Zellner (1962) . Seemingly unrelated regression analysis allows the error terms to be correlated across equations. As debts and assets are determined simultaneously, it is likely that the error term is correlated across equations. Estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions jointly as a system will yield more efficient estimates than estimating each of them separately. smoothing measures if it lives in a different state. Numerous studies have examined the differential use of social insurance programs including Social Security (for example Parsons 1980) and Medicare (for example Baicker et. al 2004) across households. Given its size, it is important to also recognize the differential use of another consumption smoothing program---bankruptcy---across households. These findings are also of the upmost importance for state governments; the majority of states make small incremental changes to their exemption laws on an annual or biannual basis. They should note that these changes not only impact the characteristics of filers, but that they also impact the portfolio decisions of all households.
VIII. Mathematical Appendix
This mathematical appendix details the theoretical model outlined in Section III.
Recall that the household's maximization problem is: 
The household's first order condition with respect to debt is:
The household's first order condition with respect to assets is:
is used to find the first order conditions.
As detailed in Section III, the lender's zero profit condition is given by: The lender's first order condition with respect to the interest rate is:
A. Predictions about Assets, Debts and the Interest Rate
The first order conditions are totally differentiated and Cramer's Rule is used to solve for dA /dE, dD/dE, dr/dE, dA/dg, dD/dg, and dr/dg. (   31  22  32  21  13  31  23  33  21  12  32  23  33  22  11   22  13  23  12  32  13  33 (   31  22  32  21  13  31  23  33  21  12  32  23  33  22  11   23  11  21  13  33  11  31 (   31  22  32  21  13  31  23  33  21  12  32  23  33  22  11   21  12  22  11  31  12  32 (   31  22  32  21  13  31  23  33  21  12  32  23  33  22 *** significant at 1 percent ** significant at 5 percent * significant at 10 percent As detailed in T able 2, known demographic variables include family size and marital status while age and education are imputed demographic variables. Income, home equity and unsecured debt are measured in $10,000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level.
Points Along Home Equity Distribution
As detailed in T able 2, known demographic variables include family size and marital status while age and education are imputed demographic variables. Income, home equity and unsecured debt are measured in $10,000. *** significant at 1 percent ** significant at 5 percent * significant at 10 percent 
